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3.1 Introduction
Inventory fluctuations are of great importance in business cycles.
Indeed, to a surprisingly large extent, business cycles are inventory
fluctuations----especially during recessions and in the early stages of
recoveries. This basic feature of business cycles has been known for
a long time, at least since the seminal work ofAbramovitz (1950).
But inventory fluctuations are fundamentally a short-period phenom-
enon. Stocks ofall types ofinventories typically amount to about three
months' sales, and even large changes in inventories amount to only
a week's sales or less. Consequently, annual data may shed relatively
little light on the nature ofinventory fluctuations; most ofthe "action"
may be played out within the year. For this reason, economists know
precious little about inventory behavior before World War II.
This paper seeks to lift this veil ofignorance in two ways. First, we
create-from some admittedly incomplete and impeIfect data-monthly
time series on inventory holdings in manufacturing, durables manu-
facturing, and nondurables manufacturing. To our knowledge, these
are the first such series ever made availablt~. We offer these data in the
data appendix to this volume (appendix B) in the hope that others will
find them useful. Second, we apply to the prewardatacertain statistical
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procedures and models that are in common use with postwar data. In
this way we can address the central issue of this conference: Has the
business cycle changed?
While we do not wish to overstate the case, we were struck more
by the similarities in inventory behavior between the prewar and post-
war periods than by the differences. Considering the tremendous changes
in the nature ofAmerican industry, in inventory management practices,
in forecasting, and in the amplitude of business cycles, we found the
degree of similarity surprising. But the relevant stylized facts are dis-
played below, and each reader can make up his or her own mind.
The rest of the paper is organized into three main sections. Section
3.2 documents the dominant role ofinventories in recessions. Here the
facts are fairly well known. Section 3.3 investigates some less well
known aspects of the variances of production, sales, and inventory
investment that Blinder (1981b, 1984) has recently emphasized using
postwar data. In section 3.4, stock adjustment models similar to those
popularized by Lovell (1961) are fit to data covering 1929-83 and sub-
periods. At least qualitatively, the results are rather similar in the pre-
war and postwar periods. Section 3.5 is a brief conclusion.
3.2 Inventories in Recessions
In a previous paper, Blinder (1981b) documented the dominant role
ofinventory swings in cyclical contractions. The data presented there
are repeated and extended in table 3.1. Panel A shows the peak-to-
trough movements in real GNP and real inventory investment in the
eight postwar recessions, using quarterly data. 1 With the single excep-
tion of the "minirecession" of 1980, which some people think should
neverhave been designated a recession, the important role ofinventory
movements is evident. Taking each recession as one observation, in-
ventory changes have accounted, on average, for 101% of the total
peak-to-trough change in real GNP. Orkeeping score in a different way,
the mean peak-to-trough change in inventory investment is 68% ofthe
mean peak-to-trough change in GNP.2
Panel B, which is restricted to annual data, shows that a similar
pattern prevailed in prewar recessions. In fact, the dominance of in-
ventory fluctuations looks even more dramatic here. However, this
1. Peaks and troughs are defined by movements in real GNP, which sometimes differ
a bit from NBER reference cycle peaks and troughs.
2. Naturally, trough-to-peak movements, which generally cover far longer periods,
show no such dominance by inventory behavior. Hence these data are not shown. How-
ever, it is well known that GNP movements in the first few quarters of recoveries are
dominated by inventory movements.185 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929









































A. Postwar Recessions (peak and trough)C
-7.1 -13.0 183 71
-20.2 -9.2 46 90
-23.0 -10.5 46 41
-8.6 -18.0 209 68
-7.3 -12.3 168 60
-60.7 -38.0 63 52
-35.0 -1.6 5 3
-45.1 -38.8 86 25
B. Interwar Recessions
-3.6 -4.2 117 30
1.5 -3.7 - d 336
1.0 -0.8 _d _e
-32.0 -5.6 18 17
-3.1 -2.9 94 11
C. Postwar Recessions (peak and trough)C
-7.5 -3.7 49 71
-2.9 -3.3 114 14
-2.0 -7.3 365 365
-22.7 -23.9 105 37
-4.4 -11.7 266 23
-28.4 -17.9 63 13
Source: Postwar data are from the national income and product accounts; interwar data
are adapted from Abramovitz (1950, table 84, 476-77).
aBillions of 1972 dollars for postwar data, billions of 1929 dollars for interwar data.
bGNP gaps are based on Gordon's (1984) natural GNP series.
CPeaks and troughs of real GNP, not official dates of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
dReal GNP rose during this recession.
eNo GNP gap in "trough" year.
may be an artifact of using annual data. l~s can be seen in panel B,
several "recessions" display no decline in GNP on an annual basis.
To get a cleaner prewar/postwar comparison, panel C puts the postwar
data on an annual basis. (Two ofthe eight recessions disappear in the
process.) Comparing panels A and C shows that annual data make
inventory fluctuations look even more important than quarterly data,186 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
as we suspected. Comparing panels Band C suggests that inventory
fluctuations played a more predominant role in postwar than in prewar
recessions.
But in any case the main conclusion is obvious: there is really no
hope of understanding the dynamics of recessions without analyzing
inventory behavior. Lest we be accused offalse advertising, we hasten
to point out that inventories play their main role in propagating busi-
ness cycles, not in causing them. We do not claim, and we do not
believe, that business cycles are typically initiated by autonomous
movements in inventory investment. In fact, as we shall show later, a
crude measure ofthe impulses originating in the inventory sector sug-
gests that they are rather small.
Another well-known fact about business cycles is that much of the
cyclical action comes in the manufacturing sector, and more particu-
larly in the durables manufacturing subsector. For this reason we tried
to use our more detailed monthly data on manufacturing to conduct a
peak-to-trough analysis ofinventory investment in manufacturing and
in the durables and nondurables subsectors.
This, however, proved impossible to do in any systematic way. One
minor problem was that monthly data on manufacturing output display
so much volatility that picking out peaks and troughs was no easy
matter. But the major problem was that month-to-month gyrations in
inventory investment are so large that-for most recessions-a stra-
tegic choice ofendpoints canmake inventorychange appeartobeeither
a large or a small fraction of the decline in production. Though it is
hard to quantify, we did cull one basic impression from this effort:
inventory swings seems to be a less dominant force in contractions in
the manufacturing sector than in the whole economy. This observation
underscores the importance of retail inventory movements-a point
emphasized in Blinder (1981b).
3.3 Decomposing the Variance of Output
So far we have considered only periods of recession, which are,
almost by definition, special cases. A more general impression of the
importance ofinventory movements in business cycles can be obtained
by asking how much ofthe variance ofoutputis attributable to changes
in inventory investment.
3.3.1 The Whole Economy
An identity relates production, sales, and inventory investment. For
the whole economy, if Y is GNP, X is final sales, and IlN is inventory
investment, the identity is:187 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
If we then detrend each time series and take the variances of both
sides, we obtain:
(2) var(y) = var(x) + var(Lln) -f- 2cov(x,Lln),
which is a convenient way to decompose the variance ofGNP around
trend.
Estimates ofthe elements ofequation (2) invariably lead to the con-
clusion that var(y) exceeds var(x); in this sense, inventory fluctuations
are "destabilizing." This is well known. ]But to go further, or to be
more precise, a serious data problem must be confronted. The period
1929-46 contains nothing but aberrant observations-the Great
Depression followed by World War II. W'hile the precise procedure
used to detrend postwar data has little effect on equation (2), quite
different results can be obtained by applying different detrending pro-
cedures to the momentous ups and downs ofthe earlier data. Thus we
really must decide how to "detrend" the depression and the war.
We experimented with two procedures and ultimately settled on one.
We first developed a purely statistical definition oftrend by regressing
the log ofeach time series in (1) on a constant, time, and time squared-
omitting the years 1930-39 and 1941-46 on the grounds that they were
obviously far from trend. Two problems quickly became apparent.
First, the choiceofwhich years to omitfrorrl the regression is somewhat
arbitrary. Second, since each time series is detrended separately, and
in logs, the identity (1) does not add up in the detrended data, and so
(2) does not hold exactly. This discrepancy never amounted to much
in previous work on postwar data by Blinder (1981b, 1984). But in this
application, the left-hand side of equation (2) turned out to be 16%
smaller than the right-hand side. That is quite a discrepancy.
So we rejected the purely statistical approach. Instead, we defined
trend GNP as Robert Gordon's (1984) "natural" GNP, which he com-
putes by applying an Okun's law conversion to a series for the natural
rate of unemployment. "Natural" final sal(~s and "natural" inventory
investment were defined, essentially, by assuming that the mean value
of X/Y observed in the sample was the "natural" ratio of final sales
to GNP. (Details are in appendix 3.3.)
Table 3.2 shows the elements of equation (2), plus some related
statistics, for the whole period and for sleveral subperiods. Several
dramatic differences between the periods 1947-83 and 1929-46 can be
observed.
First, notice that the variance of detrended GNP in the postwar
period is less than one-third as large as it was in the earlier period (col.
1), and the variance ofdetrended final sales is less than one-fourth as188 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Table 3.2 Decomposition ofthe Variance of Real GNP (Annual Data, in
Billions of1972 DoHan)
2Cov (x, an) Var (y) Var (a n)
Period Var (y) Var (x) Var (a n) (Corr (x, an» Var (x) Var (x)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1929-83 3123.7 2821.7 41.8 260.2 1.11 .015
(.38)
1947-83 1746.3 1327.1 48.7 370.5 1.32 .037
(.73)
1929-46 5992.9 5935.3 29.5 28.0 1.01 .005
(.03)
1929-41 1355.1 1109.6 28.0 217.6 1.22 .025
(.62)
Note: Entries are the variances of the differences between the actual and "natural"
times series, not merely the squared deviations of actual from natural.
large (col. 2). In contrast, the postwarvariance ofinventory investment
is actually larger than its value in the earlier period (col. 3). Thus the
remarkably more stable postwar economy did not have more stable
inventory behavior. In consequence, inventory fluctuation played a
much more important role in the postwar economy than it had previ-
ously (col. 6).
Since the covariance between inventory investment and final sales
rises tremendously after the war (col. 4, top number of each row), x
and lin are much more positively correlated in the postwar period (col.
4, bottom number). With cov(x,lin) and var(lin) both growing larger
relative to var(x), the ratio var(y)/var(x) increased from 1.01 before
1947 to 1.32 after-a large increase.
A natural question to ask is, How much ofthese differences can be
attributed to the war years? And the answer, as table 3.2 shows, is
most of it. Naturally the variances of GNP and final sales are much
smaller when the war years are excluded. What is striking, however,
is that the variance of inventory investment hardly changes. If we
compare the period 1929-41 with the period 1947-83, we find that both
the ratio var(y)/var(x) the correlation between sales and inventory change
are quite similar in the two periods (see cols. 4 and 5).
Thus, if we exclude the war years, a clear picture of continuity in
the stylized facts emerges between the prewar and postwar periods.
This is an important link to earlier work with postwar data. Blinder
(1981b, 1984) called attention to two salient features of the variance
decomposition that seem to cast doubt on the major prevailing theory
of inventory behavior: the production smoothing/buffer stock model.
Thesefeatures are: (a) The variance ofproductionexceedsthe variance
ofsales, in apparent contradiction ofthe idea that inventories are used
to smooth production in the face of fluctuating sales. (b) Final sales189 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
and inventory change actually covary positively (or not at all), not
negatively, in contrast to the alleged role~ of inventories as a buffer
stock.
Blinder(1984) shows thatthese two facts are notliterally inconsistent
with an elaborate version of the production smoothing model that in-
cludes cost shocks and allows for a complicated structure of demand
disturbances. Specifically, cost shocks lead to intertemporal substitu-
tion possibilities in production that can make it optimal for var(y) to
be greater than var(x) for a value-maximizing firm. And a particular
type of persistence in demand shocks can make it optimal for a firm
to build inventories when it experiences a positive sales shock.
Nonetheless, the facts do suggest that the theory is barking up the
wrong empirical tree in that these appendages, not the basic theory
itself, carryall the explanatory power. The central idea of the theory
is that a firm with a concave production function and sales that vary
over time (either deterministically or stochastically) will find it optimal
to smooth production relative to sales. '~fet, in fact, output is more
variable than sales. The buffer stock motive emphasizes the role of
inventories in cushioning the effects of sales "shocks" on output. Yet
inventories rise, rather than fall, when salles rise.3
Table 3.2 shows that these two troublesome features ofthe postwar
data also characterize the earlier data, and to a remarkably similar
degree ifthe war years are excluded. Thus the problems with conven-
tional inventory theory emphasized by Blinder (1981b, 1984) did not
originate in the postwar period.
3.3.2 The Manufacturing Sector
Manufacturing output is the most volatile component of GNP, so it
is worth seeing how a variance decomposition like equation (2) looks
using monthly data for manufacturing. Bt~fore looking at the results,
we should say something about how the prewar data on manufacturing
output, shipments, and inventories were constructed, although the de-
tails are reserved for appendixes 3.1 and 3.2.
In this context it is important to note that when the identity (1) is
applied to the manufacturing sector, Y denotes production, X denotes
shipments, and N denotes the stock of finished goods plus works in
progress. Inventories of materials and supplies are excluded.4 Unfor-
3. Deviations of sales from trend include both anticipated and unanticipated compo-
nents. Thus the observed covariance between inventory investment and deviations of
sales from trend is a compositeoftwo effects that presumably differ in sign. The evidence
suggests that the anticipated component of sales fluctuations is dominant, whereas the
buffer stock model stresses the unanticipated component.
4. LetYt begoods thatare fully produced within the period, Zt be goods that are started,
and qt be works in progress that are completed. Then the change in finished goods
inventories is Yt + qt - X" while the change in works in progress is Zt - qt. Adding
these up and noting that Yt = Yt + Zt gives the conclusion stated in the text.190 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
tunately, the data available to us did not distinguish among finished
goods, works in progress, and raw materials, butlumped all inventories
together. Consequently, our inventory data are not quite appropriate.
Because our general procedure was to piece together two ofthe three
time series needed for equation (1) and then use the identity to infer
the third,S this data problem introduced some unavoidable errors into
our constructed series.
For the whole manufacturing sector, we used the Federal Reserve
Board index of industrial production to create a monthly series on
output (Y) in 1929 dollars. Then we combined annual end-of-year in-
ventory datafrom Abramovitz (1950) with monthly index numbers from
the Conference BoardEconomic Recordto create a monthly inventory
stock series (N). (Details are in appendix 3.1.) From these, X was
created by using equation (1). Thus our synthetic series on shipments
is actually "true" shipments minus the change in raw materials inven-
tories (which is unobserved). Our constructed series on production is
displayed in figure 3.1. The underlying data, as well as corresponding
data on shipments and inventories, are in the data appendix to this
volume.
For the durable and nondurable subsectors, the situation was just
the reverse. Conference Board data on monthly shipments and inven-
tory stocks were used to create a synthetic "production" series from
equation (1). (Details are in appendix 3.2, and the data are in the data
appendix to the volume, appendix B.) Thus our series on Yt is actually
the "true" Yt plus the change in raw materials inventories.
With these provisos understood, let us look at the data. Because our
prewarinventory datainclude changes in raw materialinventories (aM)
even though (1) excludes them, our measured series for manufacturing
are related to the conceptually "true" series by:
A
aN=aN+aM
X = X - aM,
where "hats" denote measured time series. Hence ourmeasured series
will almost certainly overstate var(an)6 and can overstate orunderstate
var(x) and cov(x,an) depending on how strongly X and dM covary.7
The output series (Y) is constructed independently and hence is not
5. This is actually what is done with the postwardataas well. The BureauofEconomic
Analysis provides data on inventories and shipments, from which we create production
data to satisfy equation (1).
6. Only if 11M and I1N were strongly negatively correlated, which is emphatically
untrue in the postwar data, could measured inventory change display less variation than
true inventory change.
7. With the magnitudes that characterize the postwar period, var(x) and cov(x,l1n)
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Fig. 3.1 Total manufacturing production, 1929-41. Vertical lines mark
turning points.
affected by this particular measurement problem. Some evidence pre-
sented in appendix 3.1 suggests that these measurement errors are not
too severe ifwe stick to the levels ofthe variables rather than the first
differences. So that is what we do.
Butthere remains the problemof"detrending" the GreatDepression
and World War II, a period in which manufacturing output first sank
like a stone and then rose like a rocket (see fig. 3.1). Formanufacturing
we have no "natural output" series, analogous to Gordon's natural
GNP, to fall back on. So a statistical procedure was imperative. We
tried three alternatives: (a) peak-to-peak interpolation (in logs), using
1929 and either 1940 or 1941 as "peak" years; (b) estimating the 1929-
41 trend by fitting a log-linear regression line to the monthly data.192 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Notice thateitherversionofprocedure(a) treatsessentiallythewhole
period as "below trend." (The monthly data end in 1941.) This is a
strange way to define a trend, but it is conceptually close to Gordon's
"natural GNP." By contrast, a regression line must pass through the
point of means, so procedure (b) labels half the period 1929-41 as
"above trend" and half as "below trend." Neither procedure is par-
ticularly appealing. Fortunately, as appendix 3.3 shows, although the
choice ofdetrending.procedure greatly affects the estimated variances,
ratios of variances are relatively insensitive. Hence the tables that
follow use one particular detrending procedure (peak-to-peak inter-
polation between 1929 and 1941) and report only the statistics that are
"scale free."
Detrending the postwar data (1959-82) was easier. Each time series
was detrended by the following model of the trend component:
log Zt = a + bt + eDt + dAt + et,
where t is time, D t is a second time trend (for OPEC) beginning at 1
in October 1973, At is zero until January 1966 and 1 thereafter, and et
is a white noise disturbance. (The variableAt-usedbecausethe Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) has revised the data since 1966, but not
before-is unimportant in practice.)
Finally, we are ready to look at the results. Panel A of table 3.3
shows that the prewar data share with the postwar manufacturing in-
ventory and sales data the two outstanding characteristics emphasized
above:
1. The ratio var(y)/var(x) is greater than one, in apparent contradic-
tion of the idea that firms want to smooth production. This ratio is a
bit smaller in the prewar period (1.08 versus 1.15) but still greater than
one. As noted above, the model is not literally contradicted by the
finding that var(y) exceeds var(x) because cost shocks can rationalize
such a variance ratio. Nonetheless, some statement about the nature
of shocks is part and parcel of any stochastic model of economic be-
havior, and there is no doubt that the traditional production smoothing
model emphasizes demand shocks, not cost shocks.8
2. Cov(x,dn) is not negative, as suggested by the buffer stock motive
for holding inventories. In fact, the covariance is slightly more positive
in the prewar period than in the postwar period.
8. McCallum's comment offers a numerical example in which demand shocks and cost
shocks apparently have equal variances, and yet the optimal value of var(y)/var(x) for
the firm is 18.7! This example is misleading, however. By picking numerical values that
make the marginal revenue curve ten times as steepas the marginal costcurve, McCallum
makes the Lagrange multiplier (the shadow value of inventories) ten times as sensitive
to shifts in the MC curve as to shifts in the MR curve. Thus his choice of parameter
values renders demand shocks totally unimportant, as can be seen in his equations (13).
The tremendous coefficient of the cost shock (u) in the output (y) equation dominates





















Analysis ofthe Variance of Manufacturing Output (Monthly Data)














One noticeable difference between the two periods is the relatively
greaterrole ofinventory variability in the (more stable) postwarperiod.
The variance ofinventory investment is only about 1% ofthe variance
of shipments in the prewar period, but it rises to 6% in the postwar
period. This finding in the monthly manufacturing data echoes what
we saw earlier in the annual economywide data for 1929-46, but not
for 1929-41.
The third line in each panel of table 3.3 requires some explanation.
Our postwar data have been corrected (by us, not by the BEA) to
accountfor the facts that one 1972 dollar offinished goods in inventory
represents more physical units than one 1972 dollar ofshipments and,
similarly, one 1972 dollar ofworks in progress represents more physical
units than one 1972 dollar offinished goods.,9 These adjustments cannot
be made to the prewar data. Also, the aforementioned problem with
raw material inventories does not afflict the postwar data. To put the
two time periods on a more equal footing, we created an "incorrect"
set of postwar data in which we deliberately introduced the wrong
9. For a full explanation of the problem and an explanation of our corrections, see
West 1983 and Blinder and Holtz-Eakin 1983.194 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
treatment ofraw material inventories (and calculated shipments incor-
rectly from the identity) and failed to make the corrections for physical
units just mentioned.
Results with these erroneous data are presented in the third line of
each panel oftable 3.3. In general they suggest that the data errors are
not of enormous import.
3.3.3 Durables and Nondurables Manufacturing
Data problems are a little different in the durables and nondurables
sectors because here we have data on sales and inventories (including,
once again, raw material inventories) and need to construct output.
Hence our measured series are related to the "true" series by:
Y=Y+IiM
"-
liN = N + liM.
This creates different statistical biases from those present in the data
for manufacturing as a whole.
Results from decomposing the variance of output in durables and
nondurables manufacturing are presented in panels Band C of table
3.3. The results for durables are rather similar to those for all manu-
facturing, except that the ratio var(y)/var(x) in the postwar period is
much larger in durables than in manufacturing as a whole. Results for
nondurables show a smaller var(y)/var(x) ratio and less covariance be-
tween sales and inventory change but are qualitatively similar.
Thus the findings ofthis section seem quite robust. Like the postwar
data, the prewar data are characterized by a ratio of var(y)/var(x) that
exceeds unity, a positive cov(x,lin), and a small ratio ofvar(lin)/var(x).
The major difference between the two periods seems to be that var(y)/
var(x) is higher after the war.
3.4 A Simple Characterization of the Inventory Cycle
How can we characterize the cyclical behavior ofinventory invest-
ment in a simple way? The stockadjustment model pioneeredby Lovell
(1961) seems a good place to start, since it has become the workhorse
of empirical research on inventories.
The model consists oftwo equations. The first states that inventory
investment is some fraction of the gap between actual and desired
inventories, minus a fraction of unanticipated sales; the latter repre-
sents the buffer stock role ofinventories. Thus
(3) N t+1 - Nt = b(N;+ 1 - Nt) - c(Xt - t_Ixet) + et,
where N;+ 1 is desired inventories, t_IXet is expected sales, and et is a195 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
stochastic error. The second equation is a specification of desired in-
ventories, whichare commonlytaken tobe a linearfunction ofexpected
sales:
(4)
This model ofinventory behavior has many defects, some ofwhich
have already been mentioned. Io In addition, several other problems
have emerged when equations like (3) and (4) have been estimated.
One persistent problem is that the estimat(~d speed of adjustment, b,
usually turns outto betoo slow to be believed. 11 Despite this apparently
slow adjustment, the estimate of c normally turns out to be near zero
(and is sometimes negative!), suggesting that production moves almost
one to one with sales. I2 In addition, when such obvious "cost" vari-
ables as wages and interest rates are added to (4) as determinants of
desired inventories, they often get the wrong sign. Finally, except for
manufacturers' inventories offinished goods, the theoreticalmotivation
for partial adjustment is not clear. 13
Despite all these reservations, the stockadjustment model is a simple
way ofputting some structure on the data, summarizing the time series
in a way that is more meaningful than an unrestricted vector auto-
regression. Obviously, the stock adjustment model is a vector auto-
regression that has been constrained in a particular way suggested by
economic theory-which has the advantagc~ ofgiving economic inter-
pretations to the estimated coefficients.
Note, however, that the stock adjustment model is incomplete in that
it tells us nothing about the path offinal sales. Since the X t process is
autonomous, the model only describes how inventories (and implicitly
output) fluctuate given autonomous fluctuations in sales. Explaining
fluctuations in sales goes well beyondthe purview ofthis paper; indeed,
this volume contains several papers devote:d to this task.
10. For a discussion of these defects, see Blinder 1981b, 1984.
11. Maccini and Rossana 1984 appears to be a prolninent exception. But we believe
their rapid adjustment speeds are artifacts of their estimation technique. Blinder 1984,
using essentially the same data as Maccini and Rossana, reports that the likelihood
function implied by the stock adjustment model with tirst-order serial correlation in the
disturbance has two local maxima: one with rapid adjustment and high serial correlation,
the other with slow adjustment and little serial correlation. Maccini and Rosanna use a
two-step procedure that, in practice, selects the former. But Blinder 1984 finds that the
latter is the global maximum in most industries.
12. Slow adjustment and low c have often been thought to be contradictory. However,
Blinder 1984 shows that there is no necessarycontradiction. Healso shows thata negative
value of c can be rationalized if the econometrician knows less about the firm's sales
than the firm does and if demand shocks have a particular form of persistence.
13. For manufacturers' inventories offinished goods, Holt et al. 1960 and Blinder 1982
show thatthe model can be derived by maximizing discounted profits subject to quadratic
revenue and cost functions.196 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
3.4.1 Stock Adjustment Estimates for the Whole Economy
We begin with annual data for the whole economy. To "close" the
model, we assume that expectations are formed rationally. There are
several ways to estimate rational expectations models like this one.
One way, a limited information method suggested by McCallum (1976,
1979), is to substitute equation (4) into (3) and use an instrumental
variable procedure to deal with the unobserved expectation. But as
McCallum (1979) notes, this technique may not be verypromising when
both the actual and the expected value ofsales appearin the equation-
which is the case in (3).
Another way, a full information procedure suggested by Sargent (1978),
is to posit an explicit stochastic process generating sales and then
estimate the parameters of the stochastic process jointly with the pa-
rameters of(3) and (4), imposing the cross-equation restrictions implied
by rational expectations. This paper is not an appropriate place to
discuss the merits and demerits oflimited versus full information econ-
ometric procedures. Suffice it to say that both have both.
We adopted the full information technique under the assumptions
that the disturbance et in equation (3) is AR(I) and that final sales are
generated by an autonomous AR(2) time series process around a quad-
ratic time trend:
(5) Xt = ao + all + a2l2 + pXt- 1 + qXt- 2 + Ut:
As a check, we also estimated the system without the cross-equation
constraints. Much to our surprise, the constrained estimates hardly
differed from the unconstrained estimates, so we report only the con-
strained estimates (with asymptotic l-ratios in parentheses) for the whole
period 1929-83 below:
N t+1 - Nt = .19 (N*t+1 - Nt) + .075 (Xt - t_IXet)
(2.1) (2.1)
N*t+1 = 44.1 + .235 t-I Xet+1
(0.8) (1.9)
R2 = .35, p = .23, DW = 1.96
(1.8)
Xt = time trend + 1.44 X t- I - .44 Xt- 2•
(11.3) (3.3)
R2 = .996 DW = 1.86
These estimates share the problems that are familiar from studies of
less aggregative postwar data. The estimated speed of adjustment is197 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
quite low-only 19% per year. The coefficient of "unexpected sales"
gets the wrong sign, indicating that unexpectedly high sales lead to
inventory accumulation. More probably, this coefficient indicates that
ourunexpected sales proxy is not unexpected by firms, which is hardly
surprising when using annual data. 14
Since the constant in the desired inventory equation is small, the
estimated marginal inventory/sales ratio is close to the historical av-
erage inventory/sales ratio, which is .25. The AR(2) process for final
sales takes a familiar form: the coefficient of lagged sales exceeds
unity, and the coefficient of Xt~2 is negatilve.ts
These results are less than awe inspiring. One possibility is that the
stock adjustment model should be applied only to the sales ofgoods-
orperhaps only to durable goods-ratherthan to all final sales, because
there are no inventories in the service sector. However, when we did
this, the only parameter estimate that changed much was "a"-which
increased to reflect the rising inventory/sales ratio as we moved from
goods and services to goods and then to durable goods. The parameter
estimates may be unreasonable from a theoretical point of view, but
they are robust.
The simple stock adjustment model tracks history surprisingly well,
even during the Great Depression and World War II. The reason, of
course, is that our simple AR(2) model of final sales fits the data quite
well. The model underestimates sales at the start of World War II and
overestimates them by more at the end. But considering that no special
allowances were made for eitherthe warorthe depression, the tracking
performance was good.
Since stock adjustment models have been estimated many times on
postwar data, but never to our knowledge on prewar data, it is of
interest to split the data and estimate the o10del on 1929-46 and 1947-
83 subsamples. In splitting the sample, the number of degrees offree-
dom drops precipitously-especially in the prewar period. So we elim-
inated the quadratic time trend. Table 3.4 reports the results for the
whole period and for the two subperiods. 16
14. Monthly regressions with manufacturing data produce the correct (positive) sign
for c, as will be seen shortly.
15. Unfortunately, this particular AR(2) model has a root that is almost exactly
unity.
16. Notice that the earlier sample is 1929-45, not ]929-46. At first we included 1946,
but we discovered that this one year had an extraordinary effect on all the regression
estimates. It happens that inventory investment shot up to an unusually high level in
1946, even though final sales plunged. Though this rnay sound like normal behavior, it
is not. When 1946 is added to the regression reported in table 3.4, the coefficient of
unexpected sales falls from .12 to .02, the speed ofadjustment falls from .32 to .05, the
marginal inventory/sales ratio falls from .17 to .04, and the R2 ofthe equation drops from
.71 to .19.198 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
1ilble 3.4 Estimates 01 Stock Adjustment Model: Whole Economy
Parameter 1929-83 1929-45 1947-83
Inventory equation
a (inventory
accelerator)• .23 .17 .21
(18.4) (3.0) (7.0)
b (adjustment
speed) .15 .32 .10
(2.4) (2.4) (1.0)




p 1.44 1.91 1.23
(11.4) (8.8) (11.5)
q -.43 -1.06 -.23
(3.3) (3.9) (2.1)
R2a .34, .996 .71, .98 .66, .996
pb .22 .37 .28
(2.0) (2.2) (3.7)
DWa 1.97, 1.86 2.01, 1.71 2.14, 1.85
<T~ 30.3 8.51 16.2
<Tt 645.1 328.0 383.8
Note: The model is:
(3) Nt+1 - Nt =b(N~+l - Nt) - c(Xt - t_lxe) + et
(4) N~+l = A + ~_lxe
(5) Xt = const. + pXt- 1 + qXt-2 + Ute
aThe first number is for the inventory investment equation; the second number is for the
final sales equation.
bFor the inventory investment equation.
The results for the whole period are given only to provide a basis
for comparison with the subsample results. They differ insubstantially
from those given above, reflecting the fact that the best AR(2) sales
model hardly changes when the time trend is omitted.
Despite the topsy-turvy nature ofthe economy during 1929-45, the
estimates differ only moderately from those for the whole sample and
the postwar subperiod. The main difference is that the estimated speed
ofadjustment is much faster in the period 1929-45 (32% per year) than
in the period 1947-83 (10%). The marginal inventory/sales ratio is quite
similar in the two periods, and the incorrectly signed buffer stock
coefficient is smaller in the earlier period. In general, however, the
1929-45 and 1947-83 estimates of the stock adjustment are qualita-
tively similar.199 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
Finally, and not surprisingly, the estimated AR(2) processes for final
sales are quite different in the two subperiods. (Remember: no special
allowances were made for the Great Depression or World War II.)
Figure 3.2 shows how the simple AR(2) model offinal sales copes with
the Great Depression and World War II. Notice in particular that the
beginning of the war comes as a large positive sales surprise to the
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Stock adjustment model, 1929-45. Actual, solid line; pre-
dieted, broken line.200 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
One interesting observation can be added here. Notice that the vari-
ance of the disturbance term in the inventory equation--<T~-is esti-
mated to be almost twice as large in 1947-83 as in 1929-45. By this
simple measure, then, business cycle impulses originating in the inven-
tory sector have been almost twice as important since the war ended.
3.4.2 Stock Adjustment Estimates for Manufacturing
The same stock adjustment model can be estimated for the manu-
facturing sector and for the durables and nondurables subsectors. In
doing this with monthly data, we modeled shipments as an AR(12)
process around a quadratic time trend, rather than an AR(2). We do
not bother reporting the many AR coefficients, but simply confine
ourselves to three remarks. First, the coefficients in the prewar and
postwar periods are not as different as might be expected. Second,
the cross-equation restrictions implied by rational expectations were
again imposed in all equations, with little effect on the estimates.
Third, the autoregression fits the data on shipments so well that there
is no point displaying its performance graphically. Even in the tumul-
tuous prewar period, the R2 of the autoregressions never falls below
.92.
We are more interested in the stock adjustment equations. In esti-
mating these equations on monthly manufacturing data, we added three
new variables to the specification:
1. The nominal interest rate. Interest rates play an obvious role in
all theoretical inventory models but rarely "work" empirically in
postwar regressions. We thought it worth finding out if they do any
better in prewar regressions. The theoretically predicted sign is
negative.
2. Expected capital gains, as generated by an autoregression. This
variable allows the two components of the real interest rate to enter
separately rather than constraining the coefficients to be equal and
opposite.
3. The real product wage, which serves as an empirical proxy for
"cost shocks." The theoretically predicted sign is negative.
Each of these variables was entered in distributed lag form. I? The
estimates, with asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses, are shown in table
3.5 (for all manufacturing), table 3.6 (for durables), and table 3.7 (for
nondurables). In each table there are two equations for the postwar
period: the first uses the "correct" data, while the second deliberately
makes the two data errors mentioned previously.
17. These were all quadratic Almon lags running from t to t - 11 with no endpoint
constraints.201 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
18ble 3.5 Estimates of Augmented Stock Adjustment Model: Manufacturing
Postwar
Parameter Prewar Good Data Bad Data
a (inventory
accelerator) .50 3.06 1.85
(5.8) (2.5) (6.7)
b (adjustment speed) .43 .01 .02
(8.2) (1.1) (3.6)
c (unexpected sales) .11 .02 .03
(4.0) (1.8) (1.3)
Nominal interest rate 683.8 -68.4 -18.8
(sum of lag coefficients) (3.7) (2.7) (10.0)
Expected capital gains -4.9 .16 .44
(sum of lag coefficients) (4.1) (0.5) (1.6)
Real wages 1.9 - .012 -.004
(sum of lag coefficients) (1.2) (1.4) (0.7)
Variance of residualsa 0.11, .298 .133, .769 .088, .770
R2a .86, .96 .297, .995 .49, .995
DWa 1.73, 1.74 2.06, 1.98 2.08, 1.95
ph .85 .08 .23
(22.0) (1.2) (3.7)
aThe first number pertains to the inventory investment equation, the second to the sales
equation.
bAfirst-order serial corrrelationcorrectionwas madeto the inventory investmentequation.
There are both differences and similarities between the prewar and
postwarestimates. And where notable differences emerge, the fact that
the postwar estimates with the deliberate data errors are close to the
postwarestimates with the "correct" data suggests thatthe differences
are genuine, not artifacts ofthe data. As in the economywide data, we
once again find an indication that business cycle impulses originating
in the inventory sector have been larger since the war. In each case,
the variance of the residual in the inventory investment equation is
larger in 1959-83 than it was in 1929-41.
It is probably best to deal with the individual coefficients variable
by variable.
Adjustment speeds: With one exception (all manufacturing in the
prewar period), monthly adjustment speeds are very low. I8 Interest-
ingly, there is a clear tendency to find faster adjustment in the prewar
18. Notice that, in conformity with note 11, the one equation with rapid adjustment
also has high estimated serial correlation in the disturbance term.202 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Table 3.6 Estimates of Augmented Stock Adjustment Model: Durables
Manufacturing
Postwar
Parameter Prewar Good Data Bad Data
a (inventory
accelerator) 2.19 3.38 2.33
(3.3) (3.5) (9.0)
b (adjustment speed) .06 .02 .04
(2.8) (2.8) (6.0)
c (unexpected sales) .07 .01 .01
(2.0) (0.4) (0.5)
Nominal interest rate 18.2 -30.1 7.8
(sum oflag coefficients) (0.4) (1.5) (0.5)
Expected capital gains -.08 -.10 .33
(sum oflag coefficients) (0.4) (0.5) (1.9)
Real wages -.15 - .11 -.003
(sum of lag coefficients) (0.7) (1.2) (0.5)
Variance of residualsa .0022, .0134 .101, .449 .059, .451
R2a .68, .97 .35, .991 .53, .991
DWa 1.96, 1.98 2.04,1.97 2.09, 1.92
pb .34 .07 .12
(3.7) (1.1) (2.0)
aThe first number pertains to the inventory investment equation, the second to the sales
equation.
bA first-order serial correlation correction was made to the inventory investment equation.
period than in the postwarperiod-justas we found with economywide
annual data.
Inventory accelerator: In all manufacturing and in nondurables, the
marginal inventory/sales ratio is much lower in the prewar period. In
durables, this tendency is obscured by the data problems in the prewar
period.
Unexpected sales: Unlike the economywide results, the proxy for
unexpected sales gets the correct (positive) sign in all equations and is
even significantly positive in several cases. However, all the coeffi-
cients are small in magnitude. So the basic finding of a weak buffer
stock motive is maintained.
In sum, as compared with the postwar period, the inventory adjust-
ment mechanism in the prewar period in manufacturing seems to have
beencharacterizedbymore rapid (but still slow) adjustment, a correctly
signed but small effect ofunanticipated sales on inventory investment,203 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
Table 3.7 Estimates of Augmented Stock Adjustment Model: Nondurables
Manufacturing
Postwar
Parameter Prewar Good Data Bad Data
a (inventory
accelerator) 0.61 1.83 1.58
(2.1) (0.9) (4.9)
b (adjustment speed) .14 .01 .03
(3.1) (0.5) (1.7)
c (unexpected sales) .05 .07 .07
(1.3) (1.8) (2.2)
Nominal interest rate 57.2 -13.4 -7.0
(sum oflag coefficients) (2.3) (1.5) (0.9)
Expected capital gains .50 - .15 - .17
(sum of lag coefficients) (2.2) (1.1) (1.2)
Real wages .65 -.003 -.002
(sum of lag coefficents) (1.8) (1.0) (0.9)
Variance of residualsa .0032, .021 .031, .095 .022, .095
R2a .54, .88 .08, .996 .23, .996
DWa 1.93, 1.86 1.99, 1.97 1.95, 1.98
pb .43 .09 .24
(4.0) (1.4) (3.8)
aThe first number pertains to the inventory investment equation, the second to the sales
equation.
bA first-order serial correlation correction was made to the inventory investment equation.
and a lower marginal inventory/sales ratio (and hence a weaker inven-
tory accelerator).
Interest rates: The nominal interest rate variable gets the correct
sign in all three postwar regressions (using good data).19 But it is sig-
nificant only in total manufacturing, not in either subsector-which
raises suspicions about aggregation. Furthermore, the expected capital
gains term is correctly signed in only one ofthe three postwar regres-
sions, and the signs ofthe two interest rate variables are systematically
wrong in the prewar regressions. In general, the interest rate variables
19. To interpret the magnitudes of the coefficients, it is necessary to know the units
of measurement. In the prewar regressions, inventories and sales are in billions of 1929
dollars at monthly rates; in the postwar regressions, inventories and sales are in billions
of 1972 dollars at monthly rates. In both cases the interest rate variables are monthly
rates in decimal form (that is, .01 means roughly a 12% annual rate of interest).204 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
do not perform well-which echoes the findings of most investigators
of this issue.
Wage rates: Real wages get the wrong sign in two ofthe three prewar
regressions. They get the correct sign in the postwar regressions but
are far from significant.20
In general, then, neither the prewar nor the postwar data embrace
the stock adjustment model-a matter not improved by the addition of
some basic cost variables suggested by economic theory. Again, how-
ever, we find the prewar and postwar estimates quite similar, even if
they fail to accord with the theory.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
Inventoryinvestmentis the most volatile componentofGNP. Itplays
a major role in business cycles, especially around turning points and
during cyclical downswings, and is strongly procyclical. These facts
are all well established for the postwar United States economy. And
everything we know from prewar data-including annual national in-
come data and monthly data on the manufacturing sector-suggests
that the same stylized facts held in the prewar period as well.
Although the variability ofthe other99% orsoofGNPfell drastically
between 1929-46 and 1947-83, most of this can be attributed to the
wartime gyrations offinal sales. The variabilityofinventory investment
actually increased after the war. Furthermore, though inventory in-
vestment and final sales are essentially uncorrelated over 1929-46 and
strongly positively correlated over 1947-83, most of this difference is
also attributable to the war years. In fact, if the periods 1929-41 and
1947-83 are compared, the basic stylized facts about inventories and
final sales for the whole economy look quite similar.
These stylized facts, for both the whole economy and the manufac-
turing sectorin both the prewarand postwarperiods, appearto contain
bad news for the dominant empirical model of inventory behavior-
the production smoothing/buffer stock model. In particular, while the
fact that production is more variable than sales does not literally con-
tradict the model, it certainly does move production smoothing off
center stage. And the fact that sales and inventory change covary
positively rather than negatively casts serious doubt on the empirical
importance of the buffer stock motive.
Besides this circumstantial evidence, conventional stock adjustment
equations do not perform at all well when estimated econometrically:
20. In the postwar regressions, real wages are an index number (1972 = 100); in the
prewar regressions, real wages are in real 1929 dollars per hour. Hence the coefficients
are not comparable across periods.205 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
speeds of adjustment turn out to be implausibly low, the effect of
"unanticipated" sales is rarely important and sometimes incorrectly
signed, and such cost variables as interest rates and wages often (but
not always) get the wrong sign. These annoying features ofthe inven-
tory data are by now well known in postwar data. This paper shows
that they more or less characterize the prewar data as well and that
estimated stock adjustment models for inventory investment in the
prewar period look moderately similar to their postwar counterparts.
The emphasis of this paper, therefore, unlike many of the others at
this conference, is on continuity rather than on change. While other
aspects ofthe business cycle were undergoing a virtual transformation,
changes in the nature ofinventory behavior were surprisingly small.
Appendix 3.1
Construction ofTotal Manufacturing Data
This study employs new data on production, shipments, and inventory
holdings in constant dollars for the manufacturing sector ofthe United
States economy monthly from 1929 to 1942. We constructed these data
using a variety of sources; the details are presented in this appendix.
1. Production
The primary source is the monthly Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
index of industrial production (1957-59 = 100) obtained from the
Mitchell data base.! This index number was converted into a (season-
ally adjusted) series on real output measured in 1929 dollars in the
following steps:
1. From the Economic Report ofthe President, real GNP originating
in manufacturing was obtained for the years 1957, 1958, 1959.
2. The average monthly output (the sum of the three annual outputs
divided by thirty-six) was converted from 1972 to 1929 dollars using
the implicit price deflator for total goods. In addition, the units were
changed from billions to millions ofdollars to be conformable with
shipments and inventory data (see below).
3. A monthly real output series was created by using this benchmark
and the monthly percentage changes from the FRB index.
4. The real output series was seasonally adjusted using the Census
Bureau's X-II program.
1. A computerized data base containing most of the time series used by Mitchell,
available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.206 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
2. Inventories
Two basic data sources are available. From the Mitchell data base,
and ultimately from Abramovitz (1950), annual observations on the
value of inventory holdings at the end of December of each year are
available from 1929 to 1942. To create a monthly time series we used
a monthly, seasonally adjusted index ofthe value ofinventory holdings
ofthe endofeach month from the Conference BoardEconomic Record
of26 December 1940 (henceforth, CBER). Several observations are in
order.
First, the inventory data from both sources include finished goods,
works in progress, and raw materials. The inclusion of the latter pre-
sents a problem when the inventory data are used in the production-
shipments-inventory investment identity:
Yt = Xt + (Nt+ t - Nt)·
Here the conceptually appropriate inventory concept is the sum of
finished goods and works in progress. Since the identity is used ex-
tensively, the inclusion of materials stocks in inventories is strictly
incorrect, certainly unfortunate, but unavoidable. An effort will be
made below to judge the importance ofthis on all critical calculations.
Second, the series created by deflating the nominal value of inven-
tories by an (index of) outputprices does notaccurately reflect physical
quantities. This is because inventory values are book values, which
depend on the type of accounting (LIFO vs. FIFO), composition of
inventory, and whether the inventories are valued at cost or market
value. Typically, they are entered at the lower of the two choices.
These problems are not restricted to interwar data but also are impor-
tant in postwar inventory analysis (see West 1983 and Blinder and
Holtz-Eakin 1983).
Finally, the CBER index is not a comprehensive index of manufac-
turing inventories. It is based on industries that account for only about
one-eighth of inventory and shipment values, and it deliberately ex-
cludes data covering "food products, tobacco, liquors and petroleum,
and certain lumber products" (CBER, 2).
The data used in this paper were derived in the following steps:
1. Consider the two series Nt and N 2• Nt is created by benchmarking
the CBER index to the beginning-of-year inventory values given by
Abramovitz (actually the 31 December value from the previous year),
and N 2 is created by using the end-of-year values. The nominal,
monthly series we use is a linear combina~ion of Nt and N 2 given
by:
Nt = akNit + (1 - ak)N2t,
where the weight in month k is a decreasingfunction ofthe distance207 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
from the start ofthe year. Specifically, the weight (ak) for January
is 1, February 10/11, March 9/11, and so forth until ak for December
is equal to O.
2. This series was converted to a real inventory series using the index
(1929 = 100) of manufacturing prices described above. As noted
above, that inventories are often valued at cost implies that this
procedure will not exactly mimic movements in physical quantities
of inventories.
3. Shipments
Real monthly shipments (in millions of 1929 dollars) were created
using the identity
Xt = Yt - (Nt+ 1 - Nt),
and a corresponding nominal output series was created by multiplying
the real series by the price index described below. As mentioned above,
the inclusion ofraw materials in the inventory stocks induces an error
into the constructed shipments series. If X t is the "true" shipments
and Xt our estimate:
Xt - Xt = Mt + 1 - Mt ,
where M t is the raw material inventory at the start ofmonth t.
4. Price Index
The data from Mitchell contain a Bureau of Labor Statistics index
ofmanufacturers' prices (1926 = 100). The price index was first con-
verted to a 1929 = 100 base and then seasonally adjusted using the
Census X-It program.
5. A Check on Data Construction
There is one possible check on the accuracy ofthe data construction
used above. The CBER data include a monthly, seasonally adjusted
index of the value of manufacturers' shipments. Since our method of
deriving shipments understates true shipments by the amount of raw
material inventory investment (see above), it is ofinterest to see how
well it resembles the movements in the direct measure of shipments
given by the CBER index. In levels, the two measures are in close
accord; the simple correlation between them is .989. However, the
correlation between percentage changes in the CBER index and per-
centage changes in the constructed shipments series is less satisfac-
tory-.511.
Because ofthis, we investigated alternative methods ofconstructing
the data series.208 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
6. Alternative Construction of Manufacturing Data
The alternative methods of data construction all involve measuring
two of three variables-production, shipments, and inventories-and
then using the identity linking them to impute the third. Earlier, we
described a method that computes benchmarks for the production and
inventory indexes and then constructs shipments as the residual. Be-
low, we present the results ofthree variants ofthefollowing procedure:
find benchmarksfor shipments andproduction, and constructinventory
investnlent using the identity. There is a catch. We are unable to locate
a source containing estimates of the level of manufacturing shipments
in the interwar period to use in converting the CBER index number
into real 1929 dollars. Instead, we use various years from our basic
series, above, as benchmarks to the CBER shipments index and then
computeinventories accordingly. By doing this we include in the bench-
mark shipments the amount of raw materials inventory disinvestment
during the benchmark month. However, the remaining monthly move-
ments in raw materials inventory will be included in the inventory
series via the identity. Ideally, the behavior of our basic series and
the alternative will be quite similar. In practice they are not similar,
and the behavior of the alternative is highly dependent upon the
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7. Effect of Construction Method on Variance Decomposition
The variance decomposition is the workhorse summary measure in
this paper. We wish to determine the size and direction of the bias
induced into the variance measures by the alternative methods ofcon-
structing the data.
Method 1
This is the method used to derive our "basic" series. First produc-
tion and inventory data are derived, and then shipments are com-
puted using the identity. Assuming that the indexes accurately reflect
physical production and the value of inventory and that we may de-
flate using our price index (both are probably wrong):
Xl = Xt - JiMt ,
where JiMt is raw materials inventory investment in month t, Xl is
the constructed series, and X is actual shipments. Accordingly:
We know that p > 0 in postwar data. Similarly, we can show:
A
cov(xl,JiN) = cov(x,JiN) + cov(x,JiM)
- cov(JiM,JiF+JiW) - <TiM,
where JiF is finished goods inventory investment and JiW is invest-
ment in inventories of work in process. Thus:
<Til> <Ti iff 2p < <TaM/ax,
and
cov(xl,aN) > cov(x,JiN) iff cov(x,JiM) > criMi- cov(JiM,JiF' + JiW).
Neither of these conditions is satisfied in the postwar data. Thus it
seems likely that the variance of shipments is biased down and the
covariance of shipments with inventory investment is biased upward.
Method 2
In this method we use the production series derived above and bench-
mark the CBER index of the value of shipments using a shipments210 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
value from our basic series. Assuming the same things as above, this
method implies:
where X2 is the constructed shipments series, ilMB is the investment
in raw materials inventory in the base year, and XB is shipments in
the base period. Clearly, the behavior of this series is highly depen-
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Again the direction of the bias in the constructed series is unclear.
Appendix 3.2
Construction ofData for the Durables and
Nondurables Sectors
This appendix describes the construction of data on manufacturers'
production, shipments, inventory, and prices for durable and nondur-
able goods. It is worth emphasizing at the outset that different basic
data series and different benchmarks were used to construct these data
then were used to construct the data for all manufacturing described
in appendix 3.1. Hence our data for durables and nondurables manu-
facturing in the paper do not add up to our data for all manufacturing.
1. Inventories
Indexes of the value of end-of-month inventories, seasonally ad-
justed, are available from the CBERfor both durables and nondurables.
These indexes are not ideal. (See the discussion in appendix 3.1.) The
indexes were converted into a series on the nominal value (in millions
of dollars) of inventories by benchmarking the indexes in December
1937, using information in the 1937 Census ofManufactures] (in par-
ticular, 2: 121). The nominal value of inventories in the durables and
1. 1937 was chosen because this census was used by CBER to weight its indexes.211 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
nondurables sectors was computed as the sum of the end-of-year in-
ventories in the appropriate (see below) industries from the census.
Note that this includes raw materials and hence is subject to the same



















This division was chosen so as to conform as closely as possible
with the categorization used by the BEA on postwar data.
The nominal series were converted to real (1929) dollars using a
(common) price index for total manufacturing. This index was de-
scribed in appendix 3.1.
2. Shipments
The CBER data provide indexes ofthe value of shipments, monthly
and seasonally adjusted, for both types ofgoods. A direct benchmark
to convert this index number into dollars was not available. Instead,
the 1937 Census of Manufactures was employed to derive an average
value of shipments in 1937, which was equated with the average value
of the index in 1937. To do so, it was necessary to assume that the
identity
held in value terms for 1937. That is, the value of shipments for 1937
was estimated by:
value of shipments == value of production - value of end of year
inventory + value of beginning of year inventory,
where datafor the value ofproduction and value ofinventory are taken
from the census.
Then the value of shipments series constructed in this manner was
deflated using the total manufacturing price index, resulting in a series
on real shipments for both durables and nondurables.212 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
3. Production
Real production was computed using the shipments-inventory-
production identity. A nominal series was computed by multiplying the
real series by the total manufacturing price index.
4. A Check on Data Construction
Ideally, the sum of the data on, say, production for durables man-
ufacturing and nondurables manufacturing should exactly match the
data for total manufacturing. Because ofthe methods employed here,
however, this is far from true. Below are mean values (in millions of
1929 dollars) of shipments, inventories, and production for both total
manufacturing as derived above and the sum ofdurables and nondur-
ables manufacturing as derived above and the sum of durables and
nondurables manufacturing as derived for this paper.
Total Sum ofDurables
Manufacturing plus Nondurables Ratio
Production 13,216.3 4,669.7 .392
Shipments 12,858.7 4,646.8 .392
Inventory 13,405.8 9,275.7 .713
However, though the levels differ substantially, the movements in
the two measures ofmanufacturing behavior are closely related. Below




Thus, while estimates of the behavior of levels of manufacturing
shipments, production, and inventory will vary depending upon which
method is chosen, the overall response to business cycle conditions




Method Used in Text
We take Gordon's natural GNP series as the starting point, extending
it to 1983 by assuming (as he did for 1981-82) a 3% natural growth
rate. We then compute "natural final sales" as213 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
XT = eyT,
where yT is natural GNP and eis the mean ratio offinal sales to GNP
over the period 1929-83 (excluding 1932 and 1933). Although the ratio
is quite stable over time, these two years are obvious outliers and were
removed for that reason. In practice it makes little difference; our
computed e is .994, and including 1932 and 1933 changes this only to
.996.
The process is completedby computing natural inventory investment
via the identity yT = xT + aNT. Using deviations from this series gives
the variance decomposition in the text (reproduced in the top row of
table 3.A.l.)
Alternative (Statistical) Trend
Here we simply fit the trend model
10g(Zt) = ao + alt + a2t2 + Et
to each ofGNP, final sales, and inventories, dropping the years 1930-
39 and 1941-46 as aberrant. For reasons described in the text, this
procedure is not entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, the variance de-
composition derived by detrending in this manner is shown for com-
parison in the second row of table 3.A.l.
2. Total Manufacturing
The method used in the text was method A, log-linear interpolation
between 1929 and 1941. We also experimented with method B, log-
linearinterpolation using 1929 and 1940, and method C, log-linear trend
line fitted to all months in 1929-41.
Table 3.A.l
COY Corr
(J'2 (J'i (J'iN (x, aN) (J'~/(J'i (J'2/(J'2 (x, .:1N) y x ~N
Total economy 1309.9 1210.4 20.9 43.2 1.082 57.9 .271
(ECONOMIC)
Total economy 951.4 965.6 23.9 70.5 .985 40.4 .464
(STATISTICAL)
Manufacturing 7.39 6.85 .084 .270 1.079 81.8 .250
(Method A)
Manufacturing 10.35 9.73 .084 .371 1.063 116.1 .318
(Method B)
Manufacturing 7.29 6.77 .084 .276 1.076 80.8 .259
(Method C)
Note: In billions of 1929 dollars for manufacturing and billions of 1972 dollars for total
economy.214 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
The variance decomposition for each type ofdetrending is shown in
table 3.A.l.
Comment Moses Abramovitz
Blinder and Holtz-Eakin have given us a stimulating and useful paper.
Besides developing new data, their survey confirms the existence of
certain broad similarities in inventory behavior between prewar and
postwar years. At the same time, theirdataand findings raise questions
about both the observed relations between output and inventory in-
vestmentandthe adequacyofourworking modelofinventorybehavior.
My remarks are intended mainly to supplement the authors' argument
and to suggest directions for future work.
The Variances of Production and Sales
Early in the paper, the authors make a calculation decomposing the
variance ofGNP in the years 1929-83 into the variances offinal sales
and inventory accumulation and the covariance of the two. They find
that the variance ofGNPis larger than that offinal sales and, ofcourse,
that the covariance ofinventory investment and final sales is positive.
They point out that their finding "appears to contain bad news for the
dominant empirical model of inventory behavior-the production
smoothing/buffer stock model."
As the authors suggest, this finding is a generalization of what is
already implicit in a familiar observation-that for the interwar years
inventory investment rose and fell in perfect, synchronous conformity
with business cycles, at least annually. But the authors' result has
several virtues. It extends the finding to postwar years; it bases it on
an analysis of monthly data; and it derives it from an analysis of data
in all units of the entire period and not merely an analysis of cyclical
troughs and peaks.
I think there is some interest in pointing out that the results represent
a notable bit ofcontinuity in business cycles work connected with the
NBER. A finding with similar implications (but, of course, derived
from much less satisfactory data) was made by Simon Kuznets in his
second publication-his first in English. This was his Columbia Uni-
versity doctoral dissertation, prepared under Wesley Mitchell's super-
vision. It was published as CyclicalFluctuations:RetailandWholesale
Trade in 1926, fifty-eight years ago. Here Kuznets found that retail
Moses Abramovitz is professor ofeconomics at Stanford University and editor ofthe
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sales, wholesale sales, and production in manufacturing moved to-
gether during business fluctuations, but the amplitude of wholesale
sales was wider than that of retail sales and the amplitude of manu-
facturing production was wider than that of wholesale sales. By com-
paring sales and production of similar products at the three stages,
Kuznets satisfied himself that the amplitude difference was due only
in part to the presence of capital formation. items that were produced
at the manufacturers' level but that did not move through wholesale
and retail trade channels.
Kuznets's explanation of the magnification ofcyclical amplitude as
one progresses from the consumer to the manufacturer was inventory
investment. His model was derived from J. M. Clark's acceleration
principle as publishedthree years earlierin The EconomicsofOverhead
Costs. Kuznets's adaptation of Clark to the inventory case, however,
is exactly the stock adjustment model on which contemporary students
rely. Purchases at any level are the sum of expected sales-assumed,
by way ofillustration, to be equal to last period's sales-plus desired
inventory investment. Desired investment has two parts. One is a mul-
tiple ofthe change in expected sales, a multiple that reflects the desired
inventory/sales ratio. The second is the amount needed to reverse last
period's unintended investment. And unintended investment is the dif-
ference between actual sales last period and expected sales.
In developing his argument, Kuznets is fully conscious of the feed-
back from desired inventory investment to income and retail sales.
Only the absence ofa definite consumption function prevents him from
taking the subject as far as Metzler and Nurkse eventually did in their
well-known papers. In certain otherrespects, however, he went further
than these writers, and further than most contemporary treatments go
today. I want to return to that somewhat later.
Next-Igo onto the question Blinderand Holtz-Eakin's paperposes:
Why indeed do inventories serve to destabilize production rather than
to stabilize it, as the micro theory ofinventories would have it? A minor
part ofthe answer lies in the technical lock between output and goods
that are truly in the process of production or in the process of trans-
portation. I believe that a major part of the answer, however, is con-
nected with the fact that by far the greatest partoftotal stocks consists
of inventories of firms who are the purchasers, not the producers, of
the goods. They have an interest in supporting their own production
or marketing activities, not in stabilizing their suppliers' operations.
Since supporting their own activities-given their uncertainty about
the delivery ofsupplies and about theirown customers' requirements-
usually means carrying larger, not smaller, stocks ofpurchased mate-
rials when the volume of sales or production is high, an expansion of
sales is passed back to suppliers in earlier stages with magnified force.216 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Needless to say, that is no more than a partial answer. It assumes
there are good reasons, still to be spelled outquantitatively, thatexplain
why manufacturers' stocks of goods for sale do not move inversely
with sufficient force and weight to protect their production fully from
fluctuations in their sales or that explain why suppliers do not when
business falls off, offer price concessions big enough to induce cus-
tomers to build up rather than liquidate stocks. I do not have a tested
answer, but I imagine many ofus share the same hunch. Plant capacity
is expensive to hold idle, but it has the virtue offlexibility. It permits
a manufacturer to adapt the specifications of the goods he makes to
the varied and changing technical requirements ofcustomers or to the
styles that may rule when the goods are finally to be sold. In that
respect, excess plant capacity reduces risk. Inventories, on the other
hand, carry the heavy risks associated with predetermining the char-
acteristics of goods, whether in technical matters like chemical com-
position, speed, hardness, specializedfunction, and so on, orin matters
of color, style, and fashion. And that is why it is only for inventories
of durable staples made to stock that one finds the inverse behavior
implied by the buffer stock model.
This judgment again is dependent on a set of institutional arrange-
ments that makes fixed capital an overhead cost but permits most labor
to remain a variable cost. If labor became more largely an overhead
cost than it now is in this country, one might see changes in the kinds
ofgoods produced and used that would make business safer for coun-
tercyclical inventory policy. It might be useful to see whether such
changes have been taking place in Western Europe now that those
countries have made it harder to layoff workers.
Comparisons between the Interwar and Postwar Periods
The Blinder/Holtz-Eakin variance analysis generally confirms earlier
ideas that inventory investment fluctuations are positively associated
with those ofoutput and final sales. 1 Inventory investment has mostly
acted to magnify the cyclical impact of sales movements on output
rather than to cushion them. Nevertheless, the results ofthe variance
analyses do present some features that call for comment.
In their analysis of the whole economy (annual data: 1929-41 vs.
1947-83), our authors find that the covariance between inventory in-
vestment and final sales and the correlation between these variables
rise between the prewar and postwar periods. This finding is generally
1. In saying this, I disregard findings for periods including the World War II years
when extreme pressures of demand on capacity constrained inventory accumulation in
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consistent with the familiar notion that inventories have been more
tightly controlled since the war and more sensitively adjusted to move-
ments of sales. On the other hand, when they turn to an analysis of
activity in manufacturing (monthly data 1929-41 vs. 1959-82), they
find that the correlation coefficients between inventory investment and
final sales, besides being much lower in both periods than they are for
the whole economy, appear to decline between the prewarand postwar
periods. The decline is small for total manufacturing, substantial for
durables manufacturing (table 3.3).
Why these differences? Is it a difference between manufacturing and
trade? A vagary ofthe methods of data estimation our authors had to
resort to in order to build up their data for manufacturing? Or is it a
quirk of monthly data? It does seem likely that the adjustment of in-
ventories to sales would be quite rough from month to month and more
nearly paralleloversomewhatlongerintervals. Experiments with quar-
terly and annual data would be revealing.
For both the whole economy and manufacturing, the ratio of the
variance of inventory investment to the variance of final sales rises
considerably between the prewar and postwar periods. For the whole
economy, the increase is about 50% (1929-41 vs. 1947-83). For man-
ufacturing the percentage increase in the ratio is about eight times as
great.2 The same questions arise.
What should we make ofthese numbers? Although Blinder and Holtz-
Eakin point to an apparent increase in the variance of inventory in-
vestment, they conclude: "ifwe exclude the war years, a clear picture
ofcontinuity in the stylizedfacts emerges between prewarand postwar
periods." They seemto refer mainly to the ratios betweenthe variances
ofGNPand final sales and to the covariances (or correlations) between
inventory investment and final sales. Their interpretation may be right.
It is unfortunate, however, that dataproblems required them to confine
theiranalyses toa prewarperiod runningfrom 1929 to 1941 (orincluding
the war years, to 1946). In that period, fluctuations ofoutput and final
sales were, ofcourse, dominated by great contractions and expansions
in fixed investment and consumer purchases. By contrast, postwar
business cycles can be more nearly characterized as inventory cycles.
On that account, it seems important to compare the postwar years with
the predepression period, say 1919-29, when consumption and fixed
investment were also more stable.
I have not followed our authors in making a variance analysis, and
I confine my attention to comparisons between the postwar period and
2. The increase is concentrated in durables. For nondurables, the ratio rises by only
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the 1920s injust one respect: the contributions ofchanges in inventory
investment to the changes ofGNPbetween cyclical peaks and troughs.
There are two matters to consider:
1. Although the share ofinventory investment in the postwar GNP
contractions was larger than in 1919-29, as our authors say, its share
in postwar GNP expansions was smaller. The average share in the four
expansions ofthe 1920s was 43%. The average share in seven postwar
expansions was under 10%.
2. Inventory investment and GNP reached cyclical troughs together
(in annual data) both before the war and after. In expansions, however,
there was a change. Inventory investment turned synchronously with
GNP before the war. 3 After the war, however, there were repeated long
and significant leads ofinventory investment compared with GNP, which
I shall describe presently.
We can make a first, somewhat superficial approach to the change
in the inventory investment share of GNP fluctuations by considering
the differences between the durations of prewar and postwar expan-
sions. We expect the inventory investment share of GNP change to
vary inversely with the duration ofthe cyclical phase. The underlying
reason is that the change in the volume of inventory investment be-
tween expansion and contraction (or vice versa) will be strongly influ-
enced by the interphase difference in the growth rate ofGNP or final
sales. But the change in GNP itself during a contraction or expansion
will depend on both the average growth rate and the duration of the
phase. On that account, we expect the inventory investment share to
be larger in contractions than in expansions. It is a notable fact, how-
ever, that from the 1920s to the postwar period, contractions became
shorter and expansions longer.4 And these changes are consistent with
the larger postwar inventory investment contribution to GNP contrac-
tions and its smaller postwar contribution to expansions.
The reduced postwar share of inventory investment in expansions,
however, reflects more than the longer durations of those phases. In
the postwar period, inventory investment often reached its peak level
3. That is not literally true. Total inventory investment reached a peak in 1925. The
reference peak was 1926. The lead, however, was due entirely to stocks on the farms.
Nonfarm inventory investment peaked in the reference.peak year without exception.




Contractions (3) 16.0 (8) 10.0
Expansions (4) 19.5 (7) 45.9
Figures in parentheses are the number of phases.
Computed from the NBER Quarterly Reference Cycle Chronology.219 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
long before GNP and declined a great deal before the reference cycle
peak.5 Measured between GNP turns, therefore, the contribution of
inventory investment change to GNP change is reduced.
These are, in a sense, preliminary considerations. To push the matter
further, we should ask why the durations of expansions and contrac-
tions changed the way they did and why inventory investment, which
reached its peaks, as well as its troughs, more or less synchronously
with GNP before the war, has tended to exhibit a long lead at cycle
peaks in the postwar period. There are a number ofpossibilities, which
may share responsibility for the outcome.
An obvious consideration is autonomous spending. Subject as it is
to a rising trend, such spending tends to stretch out expansions even
in the face ofa decline ofinventory investment, a decline that is itself
induced by retardation in the rate ofincrease offinal sales. Inventory
investment then tends to turn ahead oftotal spending. Just the opposite
happens in contractions. The general contraction is cut short by the
rising trend ofautonomous expenditures. The GNP trough is therefore
brought closer to the low point in the rate ofdecline ofoutput and thus
to the trough ofinventoryinvestment. Autonomous spending was prob-
ably more important after the war than before. The increased impor-
tance ofgovernment outlays is the most obvious matter, but its effect
may have been supported by larger elements offixed capital formation
sustained by confident anticipations of long-term growth and so ren-
dered less responsive to short and mild contractions ofcurrent output.
Next there are lessons we can take from Ragnar Nurkse (1954). Both
the inventory investment share in output changes and the duration of
cyclical phases are under the combined influence of the marginal pro-
pensity to save and the trend of autonomous spending. Suppose we
follow Nurkse and divide total spending into autonomous spending,
invento~4Y investment, and other income-induced spending. Then it
emerges that if autonomous spending were a constant, the inventory
investment share in GNP growth or decline would equal the marginal
propensity to save, if that \\-ere constant. And that points to a reason
the inventory investment share tends to be smaller in expansions than
in contractions-the standard finding. The reason is that the Duesen-
berry/Modigliani ratchet effect makes the marginal propensity to save
lower and the multiplier higher in the latter portions ofexpansions than
it is in contractions (or during the initial recovery segment of expan-
5. Inventory investment turned down before GNP at five out ofeight postwar turning
points (annual data). There was one lead of three years, two leads of two years, and
two ofone year. On the average, inventory investment in the GNP peak years was only
61% as large as it was at its own specific cycle peaks. (Cf. Stanback 1962, who had
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sions). Ifwe now allow for autonomous spending that follows a rising
trend, than the difference between the inventory investment shares in
expansions and contractions is made all the larger.6
Our main concern, however, lies in the prewar/postwar change of
marginal spending propensities in contractions and expansions sepa-
rately. For representative contractions in each period (I set aside the
Great Depression), I suggest that the postwar marginal propensity to
save outofGNPwas probably higher than before the war. I am thinking
about the postwar built-in stabilizers. If that is right, it would help
explain the larger postwar contribution ofinventory investment during
contractions. It would also help explain the shorter duration of con-
tractions. If the feedback from inventory investment to spending is
weaker, it permits faster liquidation ofunwanted stocks and therefore
an earlier reversal of orders and production.
The situation for expansions is less clear. Built-in stabilizers act in
expansions '!S well as contractions. On the other hand, the long and
vigorous postwar expansions may have worked to lift people's expec-
tations and so to have strengthenedthe responses ofspendingto income
change as growth continued. If that is right, then by analogy with my
contraction argument, we have a consideration that helps to explain
both the reduced contribution ofinventory investment to the postwar
expansions of GNP and the longer duration of such expansions. And
all these considerations, speculative as some of them may be, are
strengthened if, as seems likely, the rising trend ofautonomous spend-
ing was more pronounced after the war than before.
Finally, there is a question about the proper lag structure in a model
of inventory investment. It bears on the observed postwar leads of
inventory investment before the upperturning points ofGNP. We know
6. Nurkse employs a simple Keynesian model. Adapting and simplifying his notation,
we may write the value of realized inventory investment (dN) at the peaks and troughs
of GNP (or indeed in any period) as follows:
dNp = (l - c) Yp - Zp
dNt = (l - c) Yt - Z[,
where c is the marginal propensity to spend, Z is autonomous spending, and p and tare
indexes for peaks and troughs. Subtracting values for troughs from those for following
peaks and expressing the change in aN as a ratio to the change in Y gives us (for
expansions):
dNp - Nt Zp - Zt
-~-- = (l - c) - --- .
Yp - Yt Yp - Yt
Ifautonomous spending is constant, the last term disappears. The inventory investment
share equals the marginal propensity to save. And (remembering to subtract peaks from
following troughs) the same is true for contractions. Allowing for a rising trend in Z
makes the inventory investment share smaller than (1 - c) in expansions and largerthan
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that in stock adjustment models the existence and importance of un-
intended inventory investment arise from the presumption that the lag
ofplanned output behind final sales is longer than the lag offinal sales
behind income. And Metzler and Nurkse have taught us that given a
relatively long output lag, it is the rise ofunintended investment as the
growth rate of sales declines that keeps total realized investment in-
creasing after planned investment begins to fall. In a pure inventory
cycle, this ensures that inventory investment and GNP reach cyclical
turns together. But ifthe output lag is short relative to the expenditure
lag, unintended investment disappears. On the other hand, as Nurkse
shows, output continues to increase after planned investment turns
down because of the lag of expenditures-and therefore of output to
meet sales-behind income produced (1954, 219-20). Realized inven-
tory investment then tends to lead turns of output.
Nurkse (1954) and others-for example, Ackley (1951) and Metzler
(1947)-have argued persuasively that the output lag is longer than the
expenditure lag. There is unintended investment. What we do not
know-at least I do not know-is whether there has been a change in
the relative size of these lags that might make unintended investment
less important and might enter, together with other factors, into an
explanation for the current long leads of inventory investment ahead
of the postwar peaks of GNP.
These comments suggest several considerations likely to be useful
in the continuing work on inventory investment and business cycles:
1. The possible importance of changes in the composition ofinven-
tory holdings in explaining changes in the behavior of the aggregate.
The differences, noted above, between durables and nondurables man-
ufacturing in the relations of inventory investment and final sales are
suggestive. So are the differences between inventory investment in
manufacturing and in the whole economy (tables 3.2 and 3.3).
2. The need to distinguish between contractions and expansions-
because ofinterphase differences in the marginal propensity to spend;
because of the differential impact of autonomous expenditure; and
because inventory responses to income change may be different in
expansions and contractions.
3. The need to consider the comparative durations of output and
expenditure lags becauseofwhat these meanfor unintendedinvestment
and for the roles of inventory investment and other spending near
turning points. Here again there may be differences between expan-
sions and contractions.
The Stock Adjustment Model
I turn now to Blinder and Holtz-Eakin's attempt to compare the
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stock adjustment model familiar in comtemporary studies. Their esti-
mates of the coefficients of the model appear to replicate the unsatis-
factory outcome of earlier work and to show that the defects charac-
teristic of work with postwar data also emerge in estimates based on
their own new prewar data. I cannot add anything substantive to their
findings, but I think it useful to raise a question that bears on the
structure ofa satis~actory model. I can do little more than indicate the
nature ofthe problem.
The standard stock adjustment models are usually, perhaps uni-
formly, evaluated empirically on the presumption that the coefficients
onthe various elements ofinventory change are cyclically stable. There
are three coefficients to consider:
The desired ratio ofinventories to expected sales.
The rate at which firms try to reduce the difference between desired
and actual stocks.
The relation between unintended investment and firms' misjudgment
of sales.
Each of these relations, however, is influenced by supply condi-
tions-by what is usually called "vendorperformance" and "expected
vendor performance." Such performance varies with the state ofbusi-
ness, and one only has to look at each month's report of the survey
ofpurchasing agents to see the interest such agents take in the changing
state ofvendor performance. When capacity utilization rises, delivery
periods begin to lengthen and to become less assured. Firms then want
to hold larger stocks to support an expected volume of sales. When
supply conditions become still tighter, there are more vigorous efforts
to meet their higher stock objectives and to correct inventory defi-
ciencies. Orders are placed further ahead and in larger volume than
would be required to meet objectives iffirms were confident thatevery-
thing ordered would be actually delivered or accepted. In spite of
magnified orders, firms may be disappointed by deliveries. The unin-
tended investment equation changes. Unintended investment is no longer
correctly portrayed as the difference between actual and expected sales.
There must be an allowance for a difference between deliveries and
orders.
It is in this respect that Kuznets'searly book went further than
Metzler did and perhaps further than many contemporary studies go.
He tried to take account, at least in a verbal treatment, of the effect
ofchanging supply conditions. And as we all know, Ruth Mack seized
on the same idea and developed it both theoretically and empirically
in her 1956 study Consumption and Business Cycles. And then Mack
and Victor Zarnowitz carried it still further (Mack and Zarnowitz 1958;
Zarnowitz 1961). Perhaps I am raising issues here that adequate tests
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have to return to the themes and problems of these earlier NBER
studies if we are to get a good understanding of the changing role of
inventories in business cycles.
Comment Bennett T. McCallum
Introduction
In its original conference version, the paper by Blinder and Holtz-
Eakin filled me with enthusiasm, for what a discussant likes most in a
paper is something of significance with which he can wholeheartedly
disagree. Now the most objectionable portion ofthe paper-agenuine,
full-fledged Keynesian multiplier model of the business cyclel-has
been deleted, taking with it a substantial part of my discussion. In
addition, other arguments have been modified and the language has
been adjusted in several ways. Nevertheless, there are a few items
remaining that call for qualification orpartial disagreement. In all cases,
it should be said, my objections are directed not at the explicit con-
clusions of section 3.5, but at statements and suggestions that are
scattered through the body of the paper. My remarks presume, fur-
thermore, that the basic rationale for the study is the possibility of
shedding light on macroeconomic fluctuations, not the analysis of in-
ventory behavior per see
There is little possibility for disagreement in sections 3.1 and 3.2,
which include (respectively) a shortintroductionand a tabulation show-
ing that the peak-to-trough declines in inventory investment are nearly
as large as those for GNP itself in both postwar and prewar business
cycles. But I would like to emphasize the restrictive nature of the
authors' statement that "there is really no hope of understanding the
dynamics of recessions without analyzing inventory behavior." It is
indeed likely that good models ofinventory fluctuations are needed to
account for the details ofmonth-to-month or quarter-to-quarter move-
ments in aggregate output. But such models may nevertheless be un-
necessary for understanding business cycles in the sense of knowing
Bennett T. McCallumis a professorintheGraduateSchoolofIndustrialAdministration
at Carnegie-Mellon University.
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1. The inclusion of this model provided a contribution, in a sense, by serving as a
reminder of what hard-core Keynesian macroeconomics was actually like. The model
implied, for example, that real GNP could be controlled (subject to random errors) by
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what are the sources of the initiating shocks and why-in the case of
monetary shocks-they have (apparently) major effects on real aggre-
gates. Nor is it clear that such knowledge is crucial to learning whether
the natureofrecessions is suchthatactivistdemand managementwould
be socially beneficial.
Variance Decompositions and Prevailing Theory
In section 3.3, the first ofthose that constitute the heart ofthe paper,
Blinder and Holtz-Eakin present a large quantity of data concerning
the variability of production, sales, and inventory changes. The dis-
cussion begins with the identity
(1)
where Yt is production and Xt the quantity ofsales during period t, with
nt denoting the inventory stock at the end ofperiod t and ant = nt -
nt _l' The variance ofproduction is then decomposed as
(2) var(y) = var(x) + var(an) + 2cov(x,dn)
where var(.) and cov(.,.) denote variance and covariance magnitudes
for the indicated series. Throughout, this decomposition is applied to
detrended versions ofthe basic variables. Since one ofthe subperiods
examined is 1929-46, the authors have some difficulty in deciding how
to detrend. Accordingly, they experiment with different methods and
report only figures that are reasonably insensitive to the method uti-
lized. This strategy is commendable, but the discussion would be im-
proved by some explicit recognition ofthe reason detrendingis desired.
Apparently their reason has only to do with the concept of "fluctua-
tions" they have in mind ratherthan a desire to obtain series that could
be viewed as resulting from covariance stationary stochastic processes.2
In their table 3.2, Blinder and Holtz-Eakin report sample variances
pertaining to the decomposition (2) using annual GNP data. For post-
war, prewar, and combined sample periods they find that var(y) exceeds
var(x) and that cov(x,dn) is nonnegative. These inequalities also hold,
they show in table 3.3, ifone uses monthly rather than annual data for
total manufacturing and its two main subdivisions (i.e., durable and
nondurable products). This finding reinforces similar ones previously
reported by Blinder (1981a, 1984) for various postwar data sets and
suggests that var(y) > var(x) and cov(x,dn) ~ 0 should be regarded as
empirical regularities that a satisfactory theory must accommodate.
This demonstrationis quite useful, as is theirconstructionandreporting
of monthly series for y, x, and n during the prewar period.
2. There seems to be, in other words, no concern for issues of the type discussed by
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The authors go on, however, to suggest that these two empirical
regularities "seem to cast doubt on the major prevailing theory of
inventory behavior." Elsewhere, Blinder has stated that "these facts
add up to a stunning indictment of the production smoothing/buffer
stock model" (1984,4). Now, to evaluate these statements we have to
specify what model or models they refer to. But there appears to be
ample reason to say that "the prevailing theory" is well represented
by the models utilized in Blinder (1981a) and Blinder and Fischer (1981)-
which are essentially the same as those in Brennan(1959), Muth (1961),
McCallum (1972), and many other papers. That Blinder himself shares
this judgment is evidenced by section 3 ofhis 1984 paper, in which he
considers the issue within precisely this framework. 3 Let us, then,
considerwhetherthis "standardprevailing" model is inconsistent with
the findings var(y) > var(x) and cov(x,an) ~ o.
The model in question pertains to a monopolistic firm4 that at t
chooses sequences of Xt, Yt, and nt values to maximize the objective
function
00
(3) EtL(1 + r)-j[R(xt+j,vt+j) - C(Yt+j,Ut+j) - B(nt+j-l)]
j=O
subject to the sequence ofconstraints
(4) Yt+j + nt+j-l - xt+j - nt+j = 0, j = 0,1,2, ...
Taking the disturbance processes {u t} and {v t} to be white noise and
pretending that certainty-equivalence prevails, we obtain first-order





-C1(YHUt) + At = 0
- B'(nt) - (1 + r)At + EtAt+1
Yt + nt-l - Xt - nt = 0,
o
where At is ofcourse the relevant Lagrange multiplier.
3. It should be noted that a slightly (but crucially) more general framework-involving
a more general specification ofthe firm's cost structure-was proposed in a managerial-
economics context by Holt et al. 1960. The most.satisfactory empirical studies I am
familiar with, namely, those of Blanchard 1983 and Eichenbaum 1984, provide results
that indicate these generalizations are important. That does not contradict the argument
to be developed in the remainderofthe present section, which is adaptedfrom McCallum
1981.
4. Eichenbaum 1983 has shown that it is not necessary to give the firm monopoly
power, as several analysts have claimed, but doing so simplifies the present discussion.226 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
To render these expressions operational, let us suppose that the R,





al + a2Xt + Vt = At
Cl + CiYt + Ut = At
b1 + b2nt + (1 + r)At = EtAt+ 1•





and the 11' values can befound by thefamiliar undetermined coefficients
procedure. The only complication involved is that there are two pos-
sible sets of solutions, these arising because 11'31 is found from a quad-
ratic equation. The approach developed in McCallum (1983) can be
used, however, to pick out the unique bubble-free solution.
To avoid entanglement in tedious algebraic expressions, let us con-
sider a numerical example that will suffice to make the relevant point.
In particular, suppose that a2 = - 1.0, b2 = 0.1, C2 = 0.1, and r =
0.01. Then simple calculations reveal that production, sales, and in-
ventory stocks obey
Yt = - .574nt_l - 4.26ut + .574vt
(13) Xt = .057nt-l - .574ut + .943vt
where constant terms are ignored. Furthermore, let us suppose that
the variances of Ut and Vt are equal in magnitude, and in particular that
(J~ = (J~ = 1.0. Also, suppose that E(utvt) = O. Then it is easily found
that
(14) var(Yt) = 23.7, var(xt) = 1.27, var(nt) = 15.8.
But these values demonstrate thatthe model athand-the "prevailing"
model-is consistent with much larger fluctuations in production than
in sales. In addition, the example yields cov(xt,ant) = 1.72 and thus
also shows that the model under consideration does not imply a neg-
ative correlation between sales and inventory change. Thus the two
empirical regularities stressed by Blinderand Holtz-Eakin may in some
sense spell bad news for "buffer stock" or "production smoothing"
notions, but they do not discredit the prevailing model in any funda-227 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
mental way. That they appear to do so in the early parts of Blinder
(1984) is because the analysis there proceeds under the assumption that
supply-side shocks are nonexistent.5
We now ask ifthis conclusion continues to hold ifone modifies the
foregoing model in the ways that the Blanchard (1983) and Eichenbaum
(1984) results suggest. The first ofthese is to add to the firm's objective
function a termthatreflects costsofchangingproductionrates, namely,
0.5C3(Yt+j - Yt+j_t)2 with C3 > O. The second is to replace the inventory
cost function implied by (7'), which is bo + btnt+j_t + 0.5b2n7+j_l,
with one of the form 0.5 b3(nt+j-1 - n;+j_l)2, where the "desired" or
"target" level n;+j_1 depends upon the rate of sales in period t + j,
n;+j-l = OXt+j.6 With those two changes in specification, the relevant




al + a2Xt + ab3(nt-1 - oxt) + Vt = 'At
CI + C2Yt + C3(Yt - Yt-I) + Ut = 'At
b3(nt - aEtXt+ I) + (1 + r)'At = Et'At+1
plus the constraint (8), which we for convenience also refer to as (8").
(8") Yt + nt-I - Xt - nt = O.
But from these conditions we see that the previous system can be
regarded as a special case of this one, the special case that obtains as
C3 and a approach zero. So at the present level of analysis the two
empirical regularities do not suffice to contradict this model either.
The foregoing does not, it might be added, constitute a claim that
either of the two models under discussion is in fact thoroughly satis-
factory. But to discredit them apparently requires more evidence than
is provided by the findings that var(y) > var(x) and cov(x,Ji.n) ~ o.
Estimates of Stock Adjustment Speeds
In their section 3.4, Blinder and Holtz-Eakin characterize some fea-
tures of the relation between inventories and sales by reporting esti-
mates of the "stock adjustment" model that has been prominent in
5. This is recognized in a later section of Blinder 1984, which also shows that non-
transitory components in the demand disturbance vt will tend to increase the ratio of
var(y) to var(x).
6. There is a related possibility, namely, that n;+)-l = aEt+)-IXt +). This specification
leads to equations (6") and (7") below but implies that (5') prevails instead of (5"). The
difference between this specification and the one in the body of the paper appears to
correspond to the difference between "precautionary" and "transaction" motives for
holding inventories. Blanchard 1983, 378, uses the latter specification but offers a ra-
tionalization that seems more applicable to the former. That he-like Eichenbaum-
avoids the "precautionary" specification may reflect recognition that it implies dynamic
inconsistency on the part of the firm.228 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
empirical work on inventory movements.7 In my notation, this model
focuses on the adjustment relation
(15) nt - nt-I = b(n; - nt-I) - c(xt - t-IXt) + l1H
where n; is the stock ofinventories "desired" at the endoftand where
t-iXt is the value of sales during t anticipated at the end of t - 1. An
essential component of this model is, of course, the specification of
n;. The ones utilized by Blinder and Holtz-Eakin are variants of
(16)
In addition, hypotheses concerning expectation formation and the gen-
eration of Xt are needed to complete the system. The authors assume
that expectations are rational, that is, that t-iXt = Et-Ixt, and that Xt
is generated by a second-order autoregression process8 that is exoge-
nous to nt:
(17)
Prewar, postwar, andfull-period estimatesofthis systemare reported
by Blinder and Holtz-Eakin based on annual aggregate data and monthly
data for manufacturing and its two major subdivisions. In all cases the
results conform to the usual finding9 that the estimated adjustment
speed, represented by b, is implausibly low. In several cases, further-
more, the estimated values of C are negative and thus inconsistent with
the theoretical presumptions of the model.
One possible reaction to this "empirical regularity" is to claim that
the stock adjustment model is without rigorous theoretical content and
so the findings should be oflittle or no interest. In my opinion it would
be wrong to take that line, for the reduced-form equation (11), obtained
above from a coherent theory, can obviously be expressed in stock
adjustment form, with 1- b = 'lT3I and with n; = no + nIEt-1xt+ 1 =
no+ nI['lTzo+ 'lTZI('lT30+ 'lT3Int-I)]. Instead, attention should be directed
toward understanding what it is that the estimates are saying in terms
of the models described above.
My attempt to do this will proceed in terms of the Blanchard/
Eichenbaum specification summarized above in equations (5") to (8").
To simplify the exposition, suppose that Cz and C3 are small enough
that we will not be misled ifwe approximate At as CI + Ute Putting that
expression in (5") and rearranging gives
7. The model is usually attributed to Lovell 1961. For a sizable number ofreferences
to other applications, see Feldstein and Auerbach 1976, 352-53.
8. In the cases using monthly data, the autoregression is oforder 12.
9. This finding gained prominence from the study of Feldstein and Auerbach 1976. It
had been noted earlier by Orr 1967 and by Carlson and Wehrs 1974.229 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
(18) Xt = 0- I[CI - al - abnt_I + Ut - Vt],
where 0 = a2 - a2b3 < 0, while doing the same for (7") yields
(19) b3nt - ab3EtXt:+I + (1 + r)(ci + ut) = CI + EtUt+I.
But from (18) we can find EtXt+I; substitution in (19) then yields an
equation that relates nt to Ut, EtUt+b and EtVt+I:
(20) (b3 + a2b~0-I)nt = (1 + ab30- I)Etllt+I
- ab30-IEtVt+I - (1 + r)ut + const.
Now suppose that Ut is not white noise but is instead first-order
autoregressive:
(21) et white noise.
Then (20) can be put in the form
(22)
where ~o and ~I are composite parameters involving a,b3,0, and p. In
terms of the white noise disturbance et this can be written as
(23)
But the coefficient on nt-l in this equation corresponds to 1 - b in the
stock adjustment expression (15). Consequently, ifthis model is a good
approximation to reality, the estimates usually interpreted as adjust-
ment-speed parameters will actually be estimates of 1 - p. Thus the
finding that these estimates are close to zero may simply be a finding
that shocks to technology-supply shocks-are highly serially corre-
lated; that the process generating these shocks is close to a random
walk. 10 Thinking about the nature oftechnological progress, and other
cost shocks, that seems to me a highly plausible interpretation.
Now most of the estimates reported by Blinder and Holtz-Eakin in
their tables 3.4 to 3.7 utilize a Cochrane/Orcutt correction designed to
take account of first-order autoregression disturbances, and the same
is true for stock adjustment estimates reported in Blinder (1984, table
4) for various two-digit industries (monthly postwardata). Forthe most
part these estimates continue to suggest that reaction speeds (b values)
are very low even when the existence of autoregression disturbances
is taken into account.
Interestingly, though, Blinder (1984, 34) mentions that:
in several cases, two local minima of the sum of squared residuals
function were found. In such cases, one of the minima always had
10. Blinder has himself pointed out this possibility in a nice discussion that is less
complicated than mine, but also less theoretically explicit (1984, 33-34).230 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
high p and rapid adjustment while the other had low p and slow
adjustment. ... This point is important because the extremely high
adjustment speeds recently found by Maccini and Rosanna (1984)
result from an estimation technique that, I [i.e., Blinder] believe,
settles on the local minimum with high p. The estimation method
used here [i.e., Blinder 1984] typically shows that the low p solution
is the global maximum.
What this discussion-together with the Maccini/Rosanna results-
indicates is that the data can be "explained" either by slow adjustment
speeds in combination with low p values or by fast adjustment speeds
in combination with large p values.ll Blinder's case for the first com-
bination relies on the empirical finding that it fits the data slightly better
than the second combination, and that the MaccinilRosanna estimates
are obtained by an inappropriate estimation technique. 12
But reflection upon the nature of the estimation problem suggests
that Blinder (1984) and the present authors are at least as guilty as
Maccini and Rosanna of using inappropriate estimators. In particular,
Blinder's procedure involves a serial correlation "correction" applied
after inserting fitted values from an autoregression on Xt to "proxy"
for rationally anticipated sales (Blinder 1984, 32). But that is precisely
the sort of procedure that involves the "pitfall" described by Flood
and Garber (1980),13 so Blinder's and the present authors' estimators
are inconsistent, and their sums ofsquared residuals are consequently
unreliable indicators ofwhich p, b combination provides a better fit to
the data. 14
Furthermore, the instrumental variable procedure used by Maccini
and Rosanna (1984) bears some resemblance to the one developed in
McCallum (1979, 67-68), which is designed to be consistent in situa-
tions with autoregression disturbances. In particular, the Maccini/Ro-
sanna procedure first estimates by instrumental variables15 an equation
in which the residual is serially correlated, then uses the residuals from
that equation to estimate the serial correlation parameter. I do not
believe that their procedure is actually appropriate, for they treat as
11. See Blinder 1984, 33-34. Also note the first column of Blinder and Holtz-Eakin's
table 3.5.
12. This claim is cited by Blinder and Holtz-Eakin, note 11.
13. The point is also discussed in McCallum 1979, 68.
14. This statement presumes that the econometrician possesses fewer data than the
agents whose behavior is being modeled. In that situation, use of "full information"
(Le., simultaneous estimation) econometric techniques will not escape the problems
discussed in McCallum 1979. With sales treated as exogenous, it seems clear that this
situation obtains in both of the studies under discussion.
15. With the instruments created by regressions on lagged values of (supposedly)
exogenous variables.231 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
exogenous variables that the theory says are jointly dependent, but it
does not seem less appropriate than Blinder's.16
In short, I would conjecture that the data are trying to tell us that,
in a representation of the form
(24)
both band p are very close to 1.0. Adjustment is essentially complete
within each period, even when these refer to monthly observations.
To complete the discussion, something needs to be said about the
tendency for estimates of c in expression (15) to be negative. A likely
reason for this finding is that it is unreasonable-and inconsistent with
the prevailing theory described above-to treat X t (sales) as exogenous
to nt. The point is that if Xt is in fact jointly determined with nt, then
it will be almost impossible to identify the parameter attached to the
"surprise" term X t - Et-1xt. Several writers have made analogous
arguments in the course ofdebates over the nature ofaggregate supply
behavior; for a more general but technically elementary treatment see
McCallum (1979, 68).
Conclusion
In sum, there are several ways Blinder and Holtz-Eakin's paper
makes a useful contribution. One ofthese, clearly, is by compiling and
reporting monthly dataon manufacturing sales, output, and inventories
for the prewar period. Another is by cataloging some empirical regu-
larities and providing prewar/postwar comparisons for several series.
But the paper's main analytical suggestions seem to be that the em-
pirical regularity var(y) > var(x) serves to discreditprevailing inventory
theories1 ? and that econometric evidence implies very slow adjustment
speeds for stock adjustment models. For the reasons developed above,
I think both these suggestions should be viewed with considerable
skepticism.
Reply Alan S. Blinder and Douglas Holtz-Eakin
The reader of Bennett McCallum's comment may be puzzled because
most of the items at which McCallum directs his fire are neither said
16. My interpretation of these results is consistent with Eichenbaum's (1984) finding
of strong serial correlation in his inventory cost disturbance \fJ(t). He also found two
local minima (i.e., likelihood function maxima) with high and low values of the serial
correlation parameter, but his maximum likelihood procedure settled on the former.
17. This suggestion has been substantially qualified in the published version.232 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
nor done in the paper he is allegedly discussing. In part this is because
the two ofus tookhis criticisms ofouroriginal draft to heartand revised
the paper substantially. Rather than being flattered by this, McCallum
appears chagrined that we have deprived him of target practice. That
is a shame, but we thought intellectual exchange was the purpose ofa
conference.
Nonetheless, at least two points need rebuttal. The primary disagree-
ment is over the nature ofthe major prevailing inventory theory-the
production smoothing/buffer stock model. McCallum seems to view it
as a model in which it is quite plausible that cost shocks dominate,
leading production to be more variable than sales. This is a strange
interpretation of a model that was designed to highlight the way pro-
duction is smoothed in the face ofdemand shocks. It is, after all, pretty
clear that supply shocks tend to make supply more variable than de-
mand, while demand shocks tend to make demand more variable than
supply. As we noted in note 8, his choice of numerical values makes
cost shocks dominate all the variances and covariances. While it is true
(see the text p. 189 and notes 10 and 12) that the empirical findings
(production is more variable than sales, slow adjustment speeds, etc.)
do not literally lead one to reject the theory, they do suggest that there
is a problem. (The major points in this debate were all anticipated in
Blinder 1984, as evidenced by McCallum's numerous references to it.)
McCallum's interpretation ofthe estimated adjustment speed leaves
something to be desired as well. To analyze this parameter using his
model, he assumes that "C2 and C3 are small" (despite earlier claims
that costs of changing production rates (C3) are too important to be
ignored). In doing so, he creates a linear cost structure in which there
is no incentive for either production smoothing or partial adjustment.
As evidence ofthis, notice that lagged inventories do not appear in his
equation (22); they show up in his equation (23) only after quasi-
differencing to eliminate serial correlation in the disturbance term.
Our final remark concerns the methods used to estimate the stock
adjustment models. McCallum takes Blinder (1984) to task for not
following econometric procedures recommended in McCallum (1979),
even though McCallum (1979, 68) notes that these procedures are un-
likely to work in an equation containing both Xt and xe
t • The reader
should realize that the full-information procedure used in the present
paperjointly estimates expectations formation, serial correlation, and
the parameters of the model. It avoids, therefore, the Flood/Garber
problem resulting from the use ofseparately fitted residuals. Any prob-
lems that remain are shared by much ofthe empirical literature using
rational expectations (for example Sargent 1978). Although McCallum
asserts a preference for the "high p rapid adjustment" estimate, we233 Inventory Fluctuations in the United States since 1929
have in fact examined the likelihood functions and found that the "low
p slow adjustment" estimate achieves a higher value in most cases-
sometimes by a narrow margin, to be sure, but sometimes by quite a
large margin. We preferto let the data, not ourpriors, decide the issue.
Discussion Summary
Some ofthe discussion was directed to the absence ofan interest rate
variable in the conference version of the paper, and these suggestions
led the authors to include the interest rate in table 3.5 in the final
version. Among those suggestingthatthe interestrate variable be tested
were Michael Lovell and Benjamin Friedman. Stanley Fischer pointed
out that the fact that interest rate effects had not been detected until
recently was consistent with the limited variation ofreal interest rates
in much ofthe postwarera, when as the Eckstein/Sinai paperdescribes,
financial disturbances influenced the real economy via credit rationing,
not interest rate variation. Recent fluctuations in real interest rates,
however, may well have caused inventory fluctuations. Fischer was
also concerned that the data used for the prewar period may have been
subject to considerable, possibly nonrandom, measurement errors.
Alan Auerbach drew attention to the model's inability to distinguish
empirically between serial correlation and the partial adjustment coef-
ficient estimated. He felt that this "weak identifiability" was a serious
drawback in interpreting the results. Robert Barro questioned how
much ofthe variation in inventories was for goods in progress and how
much was in final goods inventories, and :Moses Abramovitz stated
that for individual firms, almost all inventory variation was in final
sales, whereas for industry as a whole the variation was in work in
progress. Barro continued that table 3.1 overstated the role of inven-
tories by tabulating changes in inventories with respect to GNP, not
relative to normal inventories.
Alan Blinder agreed that it was difficult to distinguish serial corre-
lation from partial adjustment and that this was a serious drawback to
the stock adjustment model. But, he added, there are some industrial
sectors in which such a distinction is possible. He also noted that for
the whole economy, most of the variation in postwar inventories was
in finished goods, not work in progress. In manufacturing, work in
progress and finished goods are roughly of equal importance. Unfor-
tunately, there are no data for the interwar period to distinguish among
the types ofinventories.234 Alan S. Blinder/Douglas Holtz-Eakin
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